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USING LOGIC TO EVOLVE MORE LOGIC
COMPOSING LOGICAL OPERATORS VIA SELF-ASSEMBLY
TRAVIS LACROIX
Abstract. I consider how complex logical operations might self-assemble in a
signalling-game context via composition of simpler underlying dispositions. On
the one hand, agents may take advantage of pre-evolved dispositions; on the
other hand, they may co-evolve dispositions as they simultaneously learn to
combine them to display more complex behaviour. In either case, the evolution
of complex logical operations can be more e cient than evolving such capac-
ities from scratch. Showing how complex phenomena like these might evolve
provides an additional path to the possibility of evolving more or less rich no-
tions of compositionality. This helps provide another facet of the evolutionary
story of how su ciently rich, human-level cognitive or linguistic capacities may
arise from simpler precursors.
Keywords — Signalling Games; Logical Operations; Modular Composition
1. Signalling and Self-Assembly
The signalling game, presented in a classical context in Lewis (1969) and an evo-
lutionary context in Skyrms (1996, 2010), has been well-studied. The basic sender-
receiver model has been extended to shed light on a variety of philosophically in-
teresting phenomena that arise in communicative contexts.1 Barrett and Skyrms
(2017) ask how such games might evolve in the first place. In some cases, actors
may interact in such ways that can usefully be characterised as a game. This is the
focus of their notion of self-assembly. Under this description, individuals with prior
strategies for solving decision problems may come to interact. These interactions
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine
Mila, (Que´bec AI Institute / Institut Que´be´cois d’Intelligence Artificielle)
E-mail address: tlacroix@uci.edu.
Date: Draft of October, 2019; PLEASE CITE PUBLISHED VERSION, IF AVAILABLE.
1For example, di↵erentiating indicatives and imperatives (Huttegger, 2007; Zollman, 2011); sig-
nalling in social dilemmas (Wagner, 2014); network formation (Pemantle and Skyrms, 2004; Bar-
rett et al., 2017b); deception (Zollman et al., 2012; Mart´ınez, 2015; Skyrms and Barrett, 2018);
meta-linguistic notions of truth and probability (Barrett, 2016, 2017); syntactic structure (Barrett,
2006, 2007, 2009); compositionality (Franke, 2014, 2016; Steinert-Threlkeld, 2016, 2018; Barrett
et al., 2018); epistemic representations (Barrett and LaCroix, 2019); etc.
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then compose to form games. Once such simple games have arisen, they may them-
selves compose to form more complex games—ones that can, perhaps, deal with
novel phenomena more e ciently than learning new dispositions from scratch. This
may happen in a variety of plausible ways—via ritualisation, template transfer,
analogical reasoning, or modular composition. Thus, self-assembly concerns how
games and the dispositions that they implement might evolve together.
Here, I provide novel models to show how modular compositional processes may
provide some benefit over learning complex dispositions from scratch. I use logical
operations as a testbed for comparing the e cacy and e ciency of several di↵erent
models. In one case, the agents may utilise pre-evolved dispositions, which then self-
assemble, via modular composition, to exhibit more complex behaviour. In another
case, simple dispositions may evolve even while the means of composing them into
more complex dispositions evolves.2
Each of these models utilises only simple reinforcement learning, with no pun-
ishment.3 Reinforcement learning is often considered the simplest dynamic that we
can study, regarding the agents’ computational resources. All other things being
equal, this is the simplest dynamic that readily illustrates the particular phenom-
ena of interest.4 Further, since this is the dynamic that Barrett and Skyrms (2017)
discuss, using the same dynamic allows for more simple comparison of their results
(as a baseline) with the results of the present models.
In the unary logic game (Section 2), I show how a function that takes a single
proposition as its input, and which outputs a truth value, can be modelled in a
sender-receiver context, like a signalling game. Once this architecture is available
2See also LaCroix (2018b).
3This dynamic has a long psychological pedigree is a standard model for human and non-human an-
imal learning. The role that the ‘law of e↵ect’ plays in animal learning was discussed by Thorndike
(1905, 1911, 1927); this notion was formalised by Herrnstein (1961, 1970) and empirically tested
as a model for human learning (Roth and Erev, 1995, 1998). Argiento et al. (2009) analyse limit-
ing results of signalling games under simple reinforcement. For alternative dynamics, see Barrett
(2006); Barrett and Zollman (2009); Skyrms (2010); Huttegger et al. (2010); Alexander et al.
(2012); Barrett et al. (2017a). Sutton and Barto (1998) provide a computational perspective on
reinforcement learning.
4Though some bandit-type problems, which simple heuristics like Herrnstein reinforcement readily
solve, cause problems for more ‘sophisticated’ learners. See Vermorel and Mohri (2005); Kuleshov
and Precup (2014).
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to the agents, I demonstrate how we can understand a binary logical operator—
specifically, nand—as the modular composition of two unary operations (Sec-
tion 3.1). Thus, the key idea is that rather than having to evolve a binary disposition
from scratch, the agents may learn to compose two pre-evolved unary dispositions
appropriately. In one way, this is an extension of previous work on self-assembly,
insofar as the complex signalling behaviour examined here is the same as that which
is examined in Barrett and Skyrms (2017)—namely, the evolution of logical opera-
tions; however, the mechanism by which this behaviour evolves is wholly di↵erent.5
I compare the e cacy and e ciency of several means for evolving logical operations
by examining the cumulative success rates of the agents’ evolving strategies under
simulation.6 Finally, understanding binary operations as the composition of inde-
pendent (pre-evolved) unary operations, I show how this model can be extended in
several ways to obtain a more general picture of how such dispositions may co-evolve
(Sections 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5).
Demonstrating how complex phenomena like these might evolve provides an
additional path to the possibility of evolving more-or-less rich notions of composi-
tionality. Independent modelling accomplishments of this sort make successful com-
position that much more plausible as a natural phenomenon. With sparse cognitive
resources, agents can exhibit a surprising and subtle degree of complexity. This
provides another facet of the evolutionary story of how su ciently rich, human-
level cognitive or linguistic capacities may arise from simpler precursors. Such an
explanation is indispensable for research in language origins, insofar as most re-
searchers take complex (i.e., compositional, hierarchical) syntax to be a defining
5Yet another mechanism for self-assembly via modular composition is examined in Barrett (2019).
6Cumulative success of a run is calculated simply by dividing the number of successful plays in
that run by the total number of plays. The cumulative success rate is the proportion of runs that
achieved a cumulative success above some threshold. The cumulative success rate approaches 1
when the players have fixed upon a signalling system—i.e., a maximally-e cient communication
convention. A di↵erent measure of e cacy is given by the expected payo↵ of the players’ strategies
at a particular play of the game—the communicative success rate. The communicative success rate
is a ‘snapshot’ which is better suited than the cumulative success rate at providing a picture of
the estimated size of pooling equilibria: a sub-optimal random walk could spend some time above
the expected cumulative success rate for pooling equilibria, though this becomes less likely as the
threshold for the cumulative success rate increases. Still, neither of these measures guarantees
what the results will be in the limit.
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characteristic of human linguistic capacities.7 This has additional implications for
the evolution of cognition, inasmuch as a broader picture of self-assembly would
show how completely general algorithms might evolve. Furthermore, this sheds
light on how a cognitive system might self-assemble to perform epistemic functions,
such as representation, communication, and inference.8
Though the models presented here are couched in the language of logical op-
erations, it should be clear from the outset that these operators provide a simple
testbed for the broader sort of compositional phenomena under consideration. This
should be understood as providing a how-possibly explanation of the type that is
common in this field (Hempel, 1965; Resnik, 1991).9 In the conclusion (Section 5),
I discuss in more detail empirical examples that display the more general sort of
compositional processes, of which the logic games considered here provide a specific
example.
2. Simple Unary Logic Games
I will begin with an excessively simple model. Whereas Barrett and Skyrms
(2017) use the binary operator nand to compare the evolution of new dispositions,
we will see that we can understand such a binary operation as the modular composi-
tion of two unary logical operators. Consider the following four (exhaustive) unary
operations on a single input (proposition) in the context of a two-player sender-
receiver game: identity (id), negation (neg), tautology (taut), and contradiction
(cont); see Table 1.
p id(p) neg(p) taut(p) cont(p)
1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0
Table 1. Unique outputs for unary functions
7See discussion in Progovac (2019); LaCroix (2019).
8See discussion in Barrett (2019); Barrett and LaCroix (2019).
9For example, the evolutionary signalling game described in Skyrms (2010) shows how communi-
cation might evolve without natural salience, but not that or how it actually did so.
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Each of these unary functions can be modelled as a sender-receiver game, with
each game being di↵erentiated by the composition of its respective payo↵ matrix. I
will denote the game that models the id function as the ‘id game’, and similarly for
the other unary functions. The payo↵ matrices for the games corresponding to each
of these unary logical operations are given in Table 2.10 The id game is equivalent
a0 a1
s0 1 0
s1 0 1
(a) id Game
a0 a1
s0 0 1
s1 1 0
(b) neg Game
a0 a1
s0 0 1
s1 0 1
(c) taut Game
a0 a1
s0 1 0
s1 1 0
(d) cont Game
Table 2. Four possibilities for payo↵s matching states to acts: (a) is a coordination
game, which corresponds to the unary identity function; (b) is an anti-coordination game,
corresponding to the unary negation function; (c) and (d) are, what we might call, pooling
games, corresponding to the tautology and contradiction functions, respectively.
to the standard 2 ⇥ 2 signalling game. On this model, there are two states (the
truth values of p), two messages, and two actions (the truth values defined by the
operation that the game models). Reinforcement is modelled as an urn-learning
process. The sender has an urn for each state, and each urn initially contains a ball
for each message. Similarly, the receiver has an urn for each message, and each of
these urns initially contains a ball for each action.
On a given play of the game, nature picks a truth value for the proposition, ran-
domly and without bias. The sender sees the state and chooses a message randomly
from the appropriate urn for the current state. The receiver sees the message but
10I follow the convention that ‘s0’ [‘a0’] corresponds to input [output] 0, and ‘s1’ [‘a1’] corresponds
to input [output] 1. Since the payo↵s are also denoted by ‘0’ and ‘1’, this is meant to help keep
the state, act, and payo↵ disambiguated. I will refer to the input [output] as either ‘0’ and ‘1’, or
‘s0’ and ‘s1’ [‘a0’ and ‘a1’] depending upon the context and which notation allows for the most
clarity.
6 TRAVIS LACROIX
not the state; she chooses an action randomly from the urn for the current message.
If the action ‘matches’ the state (as defined by the payo↵ tables in Table 2), then
the play is counted as a success. In this case, the players each replace the ball they
chose on that round to the urn from which it was chosen and add another ball of
the same type to that urn. If the play was not successful, then they return the ball
to the urn from which it was chosen. Thus, over time, their propensities to act shift
proportional to their past successes.
Given that the id game just is a 2⇥ 2 signalling game, we know that the players
will (eventually, but usually quickly) coordinate upon one or the other signalling
system with probability 1, when nature is unbiased (Argiento et al., 2009). Indeed,
the neg game is functionally equivalent to the id game—modulo a permutation of
the payo↵s, or a re-labelling of the states or acts. Thus, it follows immediately that
the neg game also gives rise to one or the other signalling system with probability
1 (subject to the same caveats). Further, the receiver in the taut- and cont
games has an action available to her which is strictly dominant. Therefore, each
of these will converge to an optimal strategy under simple reinforcement learning,
since this dynamic converges on a dominant strategy, if there is one (Beggs, 2005).
Accordingly, success is guaranteed eventually in each of these four simple unary
logic games under reinforcement learning.
However, analytic results do not capture what happens in the short term, or how
quickly these e↵ective strategies might arise. On simulation, the average cumulative
success rates (1000 runs each) for the id- and neg games are both around 0.70 after
102 plays per run. In contrast, by 102 plays per run, the average cumulative success
rates for the taut- and cont games are already near 0.92. A comparison of the
cumulative success rates for each of these games for several thresholds is given in
Table 3. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the di↵erence in speed of convergence between
these games graphically. The relative speed of the taut- and cont games will be
necessary for explaining the results discussed in Section 3 below. Therefore, it is
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id game neg game taut game cont game
102 106 102 106 102 106 102 106
µ 0.692 0.999 0.700 0.998 0.916 1.00 0.917 1.00
0.99 0.00 0.98 0.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.04 1.00
0.95 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.21 1.00
0.90 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.78 1.00
0.80 0.27 1.00 0.29 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Table 3. Comparison of cumulative success rates for unary logic games with a variety of
thresholds for success
Figure 1. Comparison of average cumulative success rates for unary-input logic games
in the short term (102 plays per run)
Figure 2. Comparison of average cumulative success rates for unary-input logic games
in the long term (106 plays per run)
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instructive to discuss why the taut- and cont games should evolve faster than the
id- and neg games.
In the id- and neg games, the players must co-evolve their strategies to reach
a maximally-e↵ective set of strategies—namely, the ‘signalling systems’ of these
sender-receiver games.11 However, there are more maximally-e↵ective sets of pure
strategies available to the players in the cont- and taut games.12 Taking account
of mixed strategies implies a continuum of maximally-e↵ective strategies for the
taut- and cont games: every mixed strategy for the sender in conjunction with
the appropriate pure total-pooling strategy for the receiver will result in a maximal
payo↵ in the taut- and cont games, whereas no mixed strategy pro↵ers maximal
payo↵ in the id- and neg games.
Thus, it is su cient, but not necessary, that the players co-evolve their strategies
in the taut- and cont games to achieve maximal payo↵; the receiver may learn
that the signal does not matter—she should always choose action 0 in the cont
game and action 1 in the taut game.
Unary functions are simple enough that they are essentially guaranteed to emerge
in a sender-receiver context under simple reinforcement learning.13 With these ini-
tial results outlined, I describe how a binary logical operator can be composed out
of unary logical operators.
3. Composing Unary Functions for Binary Inputs
In this section, I demonstrate how actors in a signalling context might compose
unary dispositions into more complex binary dispositions. I begin with the relevant
11Technically, the maximally-e↵ective sets of strategies are only signalling systems in the id- and
neg games since these are properly signalling games, which require coordination on the part of the
agents. In the taut- and cont games, the players need not coordinate to achieve maximal payo↵—
signals need not carry any information—so it makes little sense to talk of ‘signalling systems’ or
‘coordination conventions’ in these latter contexts.
12In the atomic n-game, there are n2n strategy combinations, n! of which are signalling systems.
Thus, for the id- and neg games there are 24 = 16 combinations of pure strategies, and 2! = 2
of these are signalling systems. However, in the taut game and the cont game, there are 4
maximally-e↵ective sets of (pure) sender-receiver strategies.
13This guarantee requires that nature is not too biased for the id- and neg games (Hofbauer and
Huttegger, 2008); no such assumption is required for the taut- and cont games.
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background, against which I will compare the novel models in this paper. This in-
cludes learning to evolve a binary disposition from scratch via syntactic signalling
(Barrett, 2006, 2007, 2009) and appropriating a pre-evolved binary disposition for
a novel context via template transfer (Barrett and Skyrms, 2017). In Section 3.1,
I present a novel means for agents to utilise pre-evolved dispositions (the unary
logic dispositions discussed in Section 2) to learn more complex novel dispositions
(a binary-input nand disposition). This model presupposes that the agents have
already learned the unary logical operations and further learn to combine them
into binary logical operations. However, the assumption that the unary logical op-
erations are pre-evolved is relaxed in Section 3.2 using a hierarchical model similar
to the one employed in Barrett et al. (2018). This too involves several simplifying
assumptions, which are incrementally relaxed in Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
Each of the models I discuss uses only simple reinforcement learning, where
the propensities for actions are proportional to the accumulated rewards for prior
actions. Nature is unbiased, and players’ initial weights are always 1 so that the
probability distribution over any player’s actions is uniform to start. Finally, the
rewards are always 1 for successful actions. There is no discounting, no error rate,
no punishment, and no bounds in any of these models. In terms of our urn-learning
metaphor, each urn always starts with one ball of each type, and a single ball of
the appropriate type is added when agents act successfully.14
Since Barrett and Skyrms (2017) examine template transfer for nand, I will use
the same operator to analyse the evolution of binary logical functions via modular
composition of the unary operations that were discussed in Section 2.15 There are
14This is the most straightforward case, but there is good reason to think that the results pre-
sented will be robust to variation of these parameters. For example, Barrett et al. (2017a) discuss
a low-rationality hybrid of simple reinforcement and the “win-stay/lose-randomise” learning dy-
namic and show that it is reliable, stable, and exceptionally fast for learning in signalling contexts.
LaCroix (2018a) discusses a novel learning rule which helps avoid partial pooling, even in com-
plex games. Similarly, adding punishment or forgetting can help agents evolve optimal signalling
conventions (Barrett and Zollman, 2009).
15Barrett (2018) also discusses the evolution of nand in the context of a sender-predictor game.
However, his simulations use bounded reinforcement with punishment, which is radically di↵erent
(and importantly more sophisticated) than the generic, straightforward dynamic I consider. Still,
his general remarks regarding the e↵ectiveness of appropriation of logical operations are relevant
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several ways that we might model the evolution of a nand game using reinforcement
learning. The first, which I will refer to as the atomic two-sender nand game, is
shown in Figure 3. There are two senders, called Sender A and Sender B. There
sA
sB
mi 
m j
Nature
s0
s1
Sender A
s0
m0 m1
s1
m0 m1
Sender B
s0
m0 m1
s1
m0 m1
Receiver
m00
a0 a1
m01
a0 a1
m10
a0 a1
m11
a0 a1
Figure 3. Reinforcement learning model for simple binary-input logic game with two
senders. Nature chooses twice from one of two states; each sender chooses one of two mes-
sages from the urn matching the state received; the receiver chooses one of two actions
from the urn matching the two-input signal received. Both the senders and receiver rein-
force just in case the act corresponds (sA nand sB)—i.e., the state shown to sender A
and the state shown to sender B, respectively.
are two values for the state of the world, s0 = 0 and s1 = 1, and a full input state
is an ordered pair. Thus, there are four input states, h0, 0i, h0, 1i, h1, 0i and h1, 1i.
To be clear on notation, I will use si to indicate the state-value i 2 {0, 1} and
sij to denote the full binary state, hi, ji. I will use sA to refer to the state seen by
sender A and sB to refer to the state seen by sender B. Nature chooses each state
independently, and each sender only sees one aspect of the full state.16 mi  denotes
A’s message, and m j denotes B’s message. mij denotes the full 2-bit message that
the receiver observes. Consistent with previous work on two-sender signalling games,
I assume that the receiver knows which sender sends which message.17 Further, the
senders’ messages are independent in the sense that neither sender knows which
here—specifically, the empirical case of appropriation in the context of rule-following in pinyon
and scrub jays (Bond et al., 2003).
16This game can also be modelled so the senders each see the full state of nature and must
coordinate on how they partition nature, to encode complete information about the state. Barrett
(2018) highlights that a truth-functional rule is more likely to evolve when the senders each have
access to di↵erent, independent states of nature than when they have access to the full state.
However, such a constraint is not artificial, since the receiver must use information from both
senders; hence, this allows for a generalisable truth-functional operation. In either case, I discuss
role-free senders in Section 3.5.
17See Skyrms (2000, 2010); Barrett (2006, 2007, 2009, 2018, 2019); Barrett and Skyrms (2017).
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message the other sent. Finally, there is no requirement that the two senders be
interpreted as distinct agents—they might be understood as functional components
of a single organism.
The atomic two-sender nand game involves learning the appropriate outputs
for nand from scratch. Nature chooses a state-value randomly to send to A and
separately chooses another state-value to send to B. The ordered combination of
values hsA, sBi constitutes the full state, which can be interpreted as the binary
input for the logical function in question. Each sender chooses a message from the
urn that matches the state that she sees and sends that message to the receiver.
The receiver sees which message each sender sent, and who sent the message, and
chooses an output action, a0(= 0) or a1(= 1), from the urn corresponding to the
full 2-bit message. In the nand game, a play is successful just in case the receiver
chooses the act corresponding to (sA nand sB)—namely, she should choose a0
when both state-values are 1, and she should choose a1 otherwise. The payo↵ table
for the nand game, with both the state and act labels, sij and ak, and the actual
input-output values, 0 or 1, is shown in Table 4.
a0 a1
0 1
s00 h0, 0i 0 1
s01 h0, 1i 0 1
s10 h1, 0i 0 1
s11 h1, 1i 1 0
Table 4. Payo↵ table (states and acts) for atomic nand game
On simulation, after 106 plays per run, the cumulative success rate is 0.9053, on
average (1000 runs), when the players must learn a nand disposition from scratch.
More often than not (0.54), the players achieve a cumulative success rate higher
than 0.95, and about one-quarter of the time (0.26), they achieve a near-perfect
cumulative success rate (  0.99). In approximately one-quarter (0.26) of the runs,
12 TRAVIS LACROIX
the agents appear to get caught in a partial-pooling equilibrium. Here, they fail to
learn a maximally-e cient signalling convention for a reduced expected payo↵ of
0.75. In such cases, the receiver always chooses a1.
18
Once the agents have learned a nand disposition, they may appropriate this
disposition, via template transfer, for use in a novel context (Barrett and Skyrms,
2017). This process is an order of magnitude more e cient than learning the same
disposition in the new context from scratch. A schematic for the template-transfer
model is shown in Figure 4. We suppose that the agents have already coordinated
s0A
s0B
mi 
m j
sA
sB
Nature
s00
s01
Translation Urns
Sender A
s00
s0 s1
s01
s0 s1
Sender B
s00
s0 s1
s01
s0 s1
Pre-Evolved Disposition
Sender A
s0 s1
Sender B
s0 s1
Pre-Evolved Disposition
Receiver
m00 m01
m10 m11
Figure 4. Transfer learning model for simple binary-input logic game with two senders.
Nature chooses twice from one of two states; each sender chooses one of two messages
from the urn matching the state received; the receiver chooses one of two actions from the
urn matching the two-input signal received. Both the senders and receiver reinforce just
in case the act corresponds (sA nand sB).
upon a convention for outputting (sA nand sB) on input hsA, sBi. Thus, the urns
for these pre-evolved dispositions are already populated and fixed. Now, given a
new context with novel state-values, s00 and s01, the senders learn to appropriate the
previously evolved disposition by translating the novel states into their analogues
in the prior context. This model additionally shows how individuals who have al-
ready learned nand can quickly learn a di↵erent logical operation, such as or. See
Figure 5.
Barrett and Skyrms (2017) report that on 1000 runs with 105 plays per run, 0.78
of the runs exhibit a cumulative success rate of better than 0.80, 0.61 of the runs
18On 107 plays per run, the agents still get caught in partial pooling at a rate of about 0.25.
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p0 q0
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
p q (p nand q)
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
(p0 _ q0)
Pre-evolved DispositionNovel Context
Figure 5. Example of translating a novel context (or) into a pre-evolved disposition
(nand) via template transfer
better than 0.90, and 0.50 of the runs better than 0.95. This is roughly the same
level of success that the atomic two-sender nand game achieves on 106 plays per
run.
The template-transfer model for nand is meant to be suggestive. However, this
set up has several short-comings—for example, though the players might evolve
or via template transfer on a pre-evolved nand disposition, it is less clear how (or
whether) they might be able to use this pre-evolved nand disposition to evolve, e.g.,
and, since this operation has a di↵erent number of ‘0’ values. I will discuss these
and other considerations in more detail in Section 4 below. But first, we will see how
modular composition can be applied to the evolution of binary logical operations
out of the unary logical operations that were presented in Section 2.
3.1. Utilising Pre-Evolved Dispositions. In this section, I present one of the
key insights of this paper: the payo↵ table for the atomic nand game (Table 4) can
be understood as the composition of two unary logic games—in this particular case,
taut and neg; see Table 5. This insight is crucially important for understanding
the subsequent models presented in this paper, as each of these builds o↵ of and
relaxes certain assumptions of the basic model shown here. The sense in which I
mean that the binary logical operation nand can be understood as the composition
of the unary logic operations taut and neg is as simple as this: the truth table
for nand (Table 4) just is the truth table for unary taut stacked on top of the
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a1 a2
0 1
s00 h0, 0i 0 1
 
taut Game
s01 h0, 1i 0 1
s10 h1, 0i 0 1
 
neg Game
s11 h1, 1i 1 0
Table 5. Payo↵ Table for nand Game as the Composition of Two Unary Games
truth table for unary neg (Table 5). This compositional idea is at the core of every
model that follows in this section.
This may seem somewhat trivial; however, the order of the inputs plays a par-
ticular role in this game: the second input corresponds to the input of the unary
sub-game, whereas the first input di↵erentiates the two sub-games that compose
the nand game. Put another way, the first input tells us whether we are in the top
half or bottom half of the (binary-nand) truth table, and the second input codes
for which output is appropriate given the context that is di↵erentiated by the first
input. Therefore, if sender A codes for the first input, and sender B codes for the
second input, then the receiver might learn to interpret the first signal as specifying
which unary game should take the state that is encoded by the second signal as
input, and then output the appropriate value for that game and input.
If we assume that players have pre-evolved the unary sub-game (so their dis-
positions are already fixed), then the binary-input nand game with pre-evolved
unary sub-games can be modelled as in Figure 6. I will refer to this model as the
pre-evolved composition model. There are two senders, as with the atomic nand
game (Figure 3). A’s message codes for the first input from Nature—i.e., the unary
logic sub-game that ought to be played. The receiver must learn the meaning of this
message. B’s message codes for the second input from Nature—i.e., the input of
the unary sub-game. We assume that B’s dispositions are fixed so that she always
sends mi on input si. Thus, the receiver must choose a unary sub-game to make use
of B’s message; however, once the receiver chooses a unary sub-game, she already
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sA
sB
mi 
m j
Nature
s0
s1
Sender A
s0
m0 m1
s1
m0 m1
Sender B
s0
m0
s1
m1
Receiver
m0 
id
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
neg
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
taut
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
cont
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
m1 
id
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
neg
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
taut
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
cont
game
m 0
m 1
a0
a1
Figure 6. Reinforcement learning model for binary-input logic game assuming a pre-
evolved unary-input logic game. Nature chooses one of two states for the sender; the
sender chooses one of two messages to send to the receiver; the receiver acts according
to her pre-evolved disposition for the message received. The solid rectangles (the urns)
are determined by the input seen by a particular player. Once an urn is determined, the
circles (the balls) show what choices are available to the agent.
knows how to proceed to choose an output based on B’s message, since the four
unary sub-games are pre-evolved.19
On a given play of the game, nature chooses a state-value randomly to show to
A and separately chooses a state-value to show to B. A chooses a message from
the urn matching the observed state to send to the receiver. B’s choices are fixed.
The receiver sees each of the messages and chooses, from the urn matching A’s
message, a unary sub-game to play. Once the sub-game is chosen, everything else is
determined: the receiver performs the action corresponding to the message received
from B, given the sub-game which she has chosen to play. There are ways in which
the players can miscoordinate for a partial payo↵ in this game. The full payo↵
19This model assumes the senders’ roles are fixed—namely, A codes for the game and B codes
for the input. However, this assumption is not necessary. A role-free game with pre-evolved unary
sub-game dispositions has almost identical results as the fixed-role game presented here. Hence,
I have opted to show the simpler of these models; however, I discuss role-free senders in detail in
the co-evolutionary game presented in Section 3.5.
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table is shown in Table 6.20 As with the atomic binary-input nand game, when
a0 a1 a2 a3
id neg taut Cont
s0  h0, i 0.5 0.5 1 0
s1  h1, i 0 1 0.5 0.5
Table 6. Payo↵ Table for nand Game as the Composition of Two Unary Games
the players act randomly, the chance payo↵ is 0.5; if they fail to evolve a signalling
system, e cient pooling strategies have a success rate of 0.75.
On simulation, after 106 plays per run, the cumulative success rate for the pre-
evolved composition game is 0.9440, on average (1000 runs). The players often (0.66)
achieve a cumulative success rate higher than 0.95, and about one-third of the time
(0.31) achieve a near-perfect cumulative success rate (  0.99). Less than 10% of
the time (0.08), they fail to evolve a maximally-e cient signalling convention and
get caught in pooling equilibria—in these rare cases, the receiver fails to learn the
di↵erentiating feature of the first sender’s signal and always chooses the taut game
as the unary sub-game.
For ease of comparison, the results for 105 and 106 plays per run, for each of the
atomic, template-transfer, and pre-evolved nand games, are displayed in Table 7.21
As with template transfer, composition that takes advantage of pre-evolved unary
dispositions appears to allow the agents to learn the binary disposition an order of
magnitude faster than learning it from scratch. When the agents learn to compose
pre-evolved unary dispositions, they do comparably well to template transfer on
a pre-evolved binary nand disposition. However, although template transfer and
20Compare this with Table 5. Recalling that the unary logic sub-game dispositions are pre-evolved,
and so fixed, consider the following situation. Suppose sA = 1 and the receiver chooses to play the
neg game. Then regardless of what sB is, the receiver will choose the correct action, a↵ording each
player a payo↵ of 1. Suppose, however, that the receiver chooses the id game. Then regardless of
what SB is, the receiver will choose the wrong action, a↵ording each player a payo↵ of 0. Finally,
suppose that the receiver chooses to play the taut game. Then, if sB was 0, she outputs 1, which
was the correct action (since she should have chosen the neg game, which outputs 1 on input 0);
however, if sB was 1, then she again outputs 1, which is the incorrect action (since she should
have chosen the neg game, which outputs 0 on input 1). Therefore, the players will average a
payo↵ of 0.5, since the states are uniformly distributed. The same is true if the receiver chooses
the cont game when she should have chosen the neg game.
21The results for the template-transfer game are as reported in Barrett and Skyrms (2017); they
do not report results for 106 plays.
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Atomic Template Pre-Evolved
nand Transfer Composition
105 106 105 106 105 106
0.95 0.35 0.54 0.50 — 0.47 0.66
0.90 0.50 0.63 0.61 — 0.64 0.79
0.80 0.66 0.74 0.78 — 0.84 0.92
Table 7. Comparison of evolutionary e cacy for learning nand (a) as a novel disposition,
from scratch; (b) via template transfer on a pre-evolved nand disposition; and (c) via
simple reinforcement on pre-evolved unary dispositions
pre-evolved unary composition both take advantage of prior dispositions, the model
presented here is more e cient at evolving a nand disposition than with template
transfer, in the following sense.
The atomic nand game sometimes (0.25 on 107 plays per run) fails to evolve
nand, but pools strategies for an expected payo↵ of 0.75. Barrett and Skyrms (2017)
report that their template-transfer game fails to evolve nand at about the same rate
(0.23 on 107 plays per run). Therefore, when the players do learn the disposition,
they learn more quickly with template transfer than atomically. However, they fail
to learn as often with template transfer as they do atomically. In contrast, utilising
pre-evolved unary sub-games to learn a composed nand disposition fails less often
than either template transfer or atomic nand—only 0.08 of the runs fail to evolve
nand on 106 plays per run, and only 0.16 of the runs fail to evolve nand on 105
plays per run. Therefore, the agents in a pre-evolved nand game learn as quickly
as in template transfer, but they also learn significantly more often. Composing
pre-evolved dispositions is both as e cient and more e↵ective.22
Since the discussion of template transfer in Barrett and Skyrms (2017) presup-
poses that the underlying disposition is already evolved, the assumptions in my
pre-evolved composition model seem relevantly justified—at least for comparing
22There is a subtle point to be made clear here: recall that the cumulative success rate gives a
measure of all of the plays over the course of all of the runs. If agents are slow to learn, then early
failures may not be truly washed out. However, the communicative success rate is not history-
dependent in the same way. In this case, the pre-evolved nand game has a failure rate between
0.02 and 0.05 by 106 plays per run, as compared with a failure rate between 0.15 and 0.25 in the
atomic case. This implies that some of the runs that count as failures in the pre-evolved game
are just slow to learn. However, as was noted above, increasing the number of runs in the atomic
case does not change the failure rate—the runs that are counted as failures appear genuinely to
be caught in partial-pooling equilibria.
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these results.23 However, by cashing out binary operators in terms of the composi-
tion of (pre-evolved) unary operators, this model can do slightly more.
I mentioned previously that Barrett and Skyrms (2017); Barrett (2019) suggest
that an or disposition can easily be transferred from a nand disposition by dint of
the parity of their truth tables—both or and nand have three inputs yielding ‘1’
and one input yielding ‘0’. However, it is not so obvious how this translation can be
generalised: nand cannot be transferred to learn an xor disposition e↵ectively since
its truth values do not exhibit this sort of parity with nand—xor has two inputs
yielding ‘1’ and two inputs yielding ‘0’. Thus, understanding binary operations in
terms of the composition of unary operations has at least this theoretical virtue
over and above simple template transfer.
We have seen how nand can be composed of unary taut and neg operations;
similarly, or can be composed by unary id and taut operations, xor can be
composed by unary id and neg, etc. Since there are 4 distinct unary operators, and a
binary operator consists of some particular permutation of these (with replacement,
so we can account for, e.g., a 2-input tautology or contradiction), we have 24 = 16
unique permutations of unary operations, which correspond precisely to the 16
unique binary logical operators.
Furthermore, we know from the results of Section 2 that all of the unary opera-
tions are a ‘sure thing’ when nature is not too biased, and taut and cont are a sure
thing regardless of whether nature is biased. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
assume that these simple dispositions come pre-evolved. In such a case, the agents
can learn a complex disposition by merely learning how to code for which unary
disposition is appropriate in which context. Though the assumption that the unary
sub-game comes pre-evolved is perhaps theoretically justified, we would like a more
general picture that does not necessarily presuppose such favourable circumstances
are already in place. In Section 3.2, this simple model is extended to account for
dispositions that co-evolve.
23Note that the roles of the senders are also fixed in the template-transfer model.
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3.2. Co-Evolving Logical Dispositions. The co-evolutionary logic game is a
variant of the special composition game presented in Barrett et al. (2018); it is
a cooperative game with two base senders (whom we will call A and B) and one
base receiver. The agents in this game must evolve a particular sort of signalling
system to be uniformly successful. Additionally, there are two ‘hierarchical’ agents—
an ‘executive’ sender and an ‘executive’ receiver—who can learn to influence the
behaviour of the base agents. See Figure 7.24
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Figure 7. Reinforcement learning model for hierarchical, co-evolutionary binary-input
logic game.
A complete specification of the state is given by two properties (or features) and
a context. The properties are game (i.e., the unary sub-game) and input. Each of
the properties has two values. Considering nand as a concrete example, the value
of the game property can be taut or neg, and the value of the input property
can be 0 or 1. Therefore, the state on a particular play of the game will be either
htaut, 0i, htaut, 1i, hneg, 0i, or hneg, 1i. The context indicates which aspect of
the state—i.e., which of the two properties—needs to be known by the receiver for
her to perform a successful action on that particular play of the game. Thus, the
values for the context are game, input, or both.
24Note that I shift the notation for representing the first index from nature as “0” to explicitly
representing it as the game. It should be clear that “s00” “h0, 0i”, and “htaut, 0i” are di↵erent
representations for the exact same thing. See Table 5.
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The game is played by two base senders, an executive sender, one base receiver,
and an executive receiver. Each base sender is assigned a particular property and
only has access to that aspect of nature. (This condition is dropped in Section 3.5,
where I discuss role-free senders.) As such, one base sender sees the game, and the
other base sender sees the input. Initially, the executive sender randomly determines
whether the game sender (A), the input sender (B), or both will send a signal.
Over time, the executive sender may learn what type of signal the current context
demands—i.e., a unary logical operation or a binary logical operation.
The base receiver sees the signals sent by the base senders and knows which
sender sent each signal. The executive receiver also sees who sends the signals,
and she determines whether the base receiver will interpret the signal as a 1-bit
message—game or input—or a 2-bit message—both. The receiver performs an action
based upon her interpretation. The actions for the receiver are represented by hgame,
inputi-pairs, matching the states of nature. We assume, for now, that the receiver
‘just knows’ what the output is for this representation. (This condition is dropped
in Section 3.3.)
This can be interpreted as follows: the receiver understands the appropriate
output—0 or 1—for a given state; however, she does not have access to the current
state. Thus, the players must co-evolve a communication system whereby the re-
ceiver gains knowledge about the current state. Once the receiver knows the current
state, she automatically knows the correct output. Thus, the actions are represented
by htaut, 0i, htaut, 1i, hneg, 0i, and hneg, 1i. Note that, on this model, the re-
ceiver does not have access to representations for cont or id. (This condition is
dropped in Section 3.4.)
The agents are successful on a particular play of the game just in case (1) the
base receiver performs the correct action given the current context and (2) the base
senders only sent the signals required for success given the context. Thus, to be
successful, the receiver’s action must be appropriate for the state, and the senders
must be as e cient as possible—i.e., they must not send any irrelevant signals.
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The ‘e ciency’ condition requires the base senders to coordinate, additionally, on
something like a pragmatic maxim of relation—namely, the signal sent must be
relevant to the current type of context (Grice, 1975). This condition is what drives
the co-evolution of the unary dispositions and their composition.25 See Figure 8 for
an example.
Nature Base Senders Base Receiver
Context
Both
Game
Input
Who Sends?
Sender A
Sender B
Sender A Only
Sender B Only
State Action
h , 0i h , 0i
h , 0i h , 0ih , 1i
hneg, 0i hneg, 0ihtaut, 0i
Figure 8. Example of success conditions for the three types of context. Each row specifies
what is required for success in that row’s context. Not pictured here are the roles of
the executive players; however, they play a part in the success conditions, insofar as
the executive sender determines which sender sends a signal, and the executive receiver
determines how the sender interprets the signal.
Again, agents learn via simple reinforcement. On each play, nature determines a
state by choosing a value for each of the two properties and the context randomly
and with uniform probabilities. The executive sender is equipped with an urn for
each of the three context-values—game, input, and both. Each urn begins with one
ball of each type: Sender A, Sender B, and Both. The executive sender observes
the context and randomly draws a ball from the corresponding urn. The drawn ball
determines who will send a signal.
25For example, when the value of the context is game, the input is irrelevant, so the sender need
only pick an action having to do with the game-value of the state on that round; and, mutatis
mutandis when the value of the context is input. It may seem counterintuitive to ‘successfully’
play a game without knowing the appropriate input, or to ‘successfully’ choose an output without
knowing the game. However, recall that ‘game’ and ‘input’ are peculiar to the structure of the
logic game being discussed. The game itself, as was mentioned in the introduction, is only meant
to serve as a relatively clear testbed for the types of compositional processes of interest here.
Nonetheless, I discuss real-world interpretations in Section 5. An alternative way of enforcing
e ciency is to posit a cost for signals. However, to maintain consistency with the parameters of
the other models presented here—i.e., no punishment—a more stringent condition is placed on
what counts as a success.
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A is equipped with an urn labelled taut, and an urn labelled neg; each initially
contains a ball labelled m0, and a ball labelled m1. If the executive sender draws
a ball requiring A to send a signal, then A randomly draws a ball from the urn
corresponding to the property she observes, and she sends the corresponding signal.
Similarly, B is equipped with an urn labelled 0, and an urn labelled 1—each initially
containing a ball labelled m0, and a ball labelled m1. If required by the executive
sender, she draws a ball from the urn corresponding to the property that she sees
and sends that signal to the receiver.
The receiver has four urns, one for every ordered pair of signals she might receive
from A and B, respectively: m00, m01, m10, and m11. Each urn begins with one
ball for each of the game-input pairs: htaut, 0i, htaut, 1i, hneg, 0i, or hneg, 1i. If
both senders send a signal, then the receiver draws a ball randomly from the corre-
sponding urn. If only one sender sends a signal, then the receiver randomly chooses,
with unbiased probabilities, one of the two urns corresponding to the sender’s signal
then draws a ball randomly from that urn.
The executive receiver determines how the receiver will interpret the type of
signal she received. This interpretation, in conjunction with the ball the receiver
drew determines how the receiver will act. The executive receiver is equipped with
a game-sender urn, an input-sender urn, and a both urn. Each of these initially
contains a game ball, an input ball, and a both ball. The ball drawn by the executive
receiver determines what type of act the receiver takes as salient given the signal(s)
that she has received.
If a play of the game is successful, as per the conditions described above, then
each agent who was involved in that particular play returns the ball she drew to
the urn from which she drew it and adds another ball of the same type to that urn.
Otherwise, each agent simply returns the ball she drew to the urn from which she
drew it.
On simulation, the agents nearly always evolve a successful and optimally e cient
communication system. After 106 plays per run, the cumulative success rate is
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0.9716, on average (1000 runs). The players usually (0.88) achieve a cumulative
success rate higher than 0.95, and most of the time (0.63) they achieve a near-perfect
cumulative success rate (  0.99). Rarely (0.04), they fail to evolve a maximally-
e cient signalling convention and get caught in pooling equilibria.26
Comparing the cumulative success rates, we see that the co-evolutionary nand
game evolves an order of magnitude faster than the pre-evolved nand game, which
in turn evolved an order of magnitude faster than the atomic nand game on the
same learning dynamic. This is despite the fact that the chance payo↵ for the co-
evolved nand game is less than the chance payo↵ for the atomic or pre-evolved
games. (Since the receiver has twice as many options, the chance payo↵ is 0.25,
rather than 0.50.) Thus, this game starts with a significant handicap, but still
outperforms learning nand from scratch by at least an order of magnitude. See
Table 8. Part of the reason for this is the full set of conditions for what success
Atomic Template Pre-Evolved Co-Evolved
nand Transfer Composition Composition
105 106 105 106 105 106 105 106
0.95 0.35 0.54 0.50 — 0.47 0.66 0.64 0.88
0.90 0.50 0.63 0.61 — 0.64 0.79 0.79 0.92
0.80 0.66 0.74 0.78 — 0.84 0.92 0.89 0.96
Table 8. Comparison of evolutionary e cacy for learning nand (a) as a novel disposition,
from scratch; (b) via template transfer on a pre-evolved nand disposition; (c) via simple
reinforcement on pre-evolved unary dispositions; and (d) via co-evolved unary dispositions
consists in. The payo↵s structure the dispositions of the agents so that they cannot
be successful in any way unless they are successful in every way. This is discussed
in more detail in Section 4.
There are a significant number of simplifying assumptions made in this model,
which one may worry are allowing for the high rates of success that we see on
simulation. First, I assumed that the receiver ‘just knows’ how to interpret an
26Again, if we examine the ‘snapshot’ measure of the communicative success rate, the results are
slightly better. The average expected payo↵ after 106 plays per run is 0.9747. More than three-
quarters of the time, the agents achieve a near-perfect communication convention for a payo↵
greater than 0.99. Still, 0.04 runs fail to exceed a payo↵ that could be got by a partial-pooling
convention.
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action, such as htaut, 1i—i.e., by outputting 1. Second, I assumed that the only
possible states for the game were taut and neg. This is a simplification, given
that there are two additional unary operations which the agents may well learn in a
general framework, but which happen not to be useful for producing the appropriate
action in the nand context. Finally, I assumed that each base sender is assigned a
particular property—game or input—and only has access to that aspect of nature.
Thus, the roles of the senders are fixed.
I relax the first assumption in Section 3.3, where the receiver must also learn
which output, 0 or 1, is appropriate for which state. The second assumption is
relaxed in Section 3.4, where I extend the composition game to account for the full
action space of unary operations. Finally, in Section 3.5, I drop the assumption that
the roles of the base senders are fixed.27 These results are discussed in more detail
in Section 4.
3.3. Learning Appropriate Outputs. In this section, I drop the condition that
the receiver ‘just knows’ what to do with the ‘action’ she has chosen from her
urn. This game is modelled precisely as the co-evolutionary logic game, except for
the following modification. Instead of 4 balls with the state labels, each of the
receiver’s urns has 8 balls with the state-labels plus an output—0 or 1. Thus, each
ball has three-part label corresponding to the game component of the state, the
input component of the state, and the output component of the state—thus, balls
on this interpretation are labelled hgame, input, outputi.
Now, it is not pre-supposed that the receiver ‘just knows’ what action she ought
to perform when she draws the ball htaut, 0i, since she has balls labelled htaut,
0, 0i and htaut, 0, 1i. Thus, she must learn which output is correct, given the
complex state.
On this model, the players are successful in coordinating their actions just in
case (1) the receiver performs the correct action for the given context, and (2) the
27Each of these assumptions is dropped independently of the others. This is meant only to be
suggestive concerning the e↵ects of these individual assumptions on the simulation results. It
would be ideal, though due to space constraints impractical, to look at dropping combinations of
assumptions to see whether there are interaction e↵ects between these several parameters.
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senders only sent the signals required for success given the context, and (3) the
receiver chooses the correct output given the action selected. The rest of the game
is as was described before.
On the co-evolutionary logic game with learned inputs, the agents still e↵ectively
always learn a successful and optimally e cient communication system. After 106
plays per run, the cumulative success rate is 0.9313, on average (1000 runs). More
than half the time (0.57), the senders and receiver achieve a cumulative success
rate higher than 0.95, though they rarely (0.03) achieve a near-perfect cumulative
success rate (  0.99). In very few cases (0.07), they fail to evolve a maximally-
e cient signalling convention and get caught in pooling equilibria. These results
are comparable to the basic co-evolutionary nand game, where it is assumed that
the receiver knows what to do given the state, even though the players start at a
significant disadvantage—the chance payo↵ at the outset is half that of the basic
co-evolved nand game and one-quarter that of the pre-evolved and atomic nand
games.
3.4. Taking Account of the Full State Space of Unary Games. In this
section, I drop the assumption that the only games available to the receiver are taut
and neg. Though the id and cont games are not appropriate for the nand game,
one might argue that the receiver must learn that these actions are inappropriate.
This condition is dropped by extending the basic co-evolutionary nand game (3.2)
to a more general logic game. Now, there are 8 actions that the receiver might
choose, corresponding to the eight combinations of taut, cont, id and neg with
the inputs 0 and 1.28
On the co-evolutionary logic game where the receiver needs to di↵erentiate the
appropriate action from the full state space of unary sub-games, the results are
similar to the case where the agent needs to learn the correct output for a given
state—it is slightly less e cient and slower to learn initially. Both of these facts
28Formally, this model is similar to the model of Section 3.3, where the receiver must additionally
learn the appropriate output for a given state. However, the success conditions are di↵erent when
the context is game only; thus, these models are not functionally equivalent.
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make sense since the models are similar in complexity, but, in this case, there are
fewer situations that constitute a success. After 106 plays per run, the cumulative
success rate is 0.9458, on average (1000 runs). More than three-quarters of the time
(0.78), the agents achieve a cumulative success rate higher than 0.95, and they
often (0.43) achieve a near-perfect cumulative success rate (  0.99). In some cases
(0.10), they fail to evolve a maximally-e cient signalling convention and appear to
get caught in pooling equilibria.
3.5. Role-Free Composition. The final assumption that I examine is that the
roles of the base senders are fixed. As was mentioned previously, assuming that the
roles of the base senders are pre-assigned imposes a fair amount of structure on the
hierarchical co-evolutionary nand model. For one, this guarantees that the execu-
tive agents always learn to coordinate. On the other hand, a truth-functional rule
is more likely to evolve when the senders each have access to di↵erent, independent
states of nature than when they have access to the full state of nature.29
On the role-free co-evolutionary logic game, the base senders have no pre-assigned
representational roles. Instead, they are both shown the full state of nature. In this
case, the base senders must learn to coordinate their roles to partition nature fully,
and the executive agents must learn what roles the base senders are playing. The
executive agents thus co-evolve their dispositions even while the base agents are
learning their representational roles.
Since there are no stipulated roles for the base senders, there is no stipulated
game sender or input sender. On each play of the game, the senders are both shown
one of the four states (but not the context-value). These, again, are htaut, 0i,
htaut, 1i, hneg, 0i, and hneg, 1i. Each sender has an urn for each of these states,
and each urn contains balls labelled m0 and m1. Each sender still has only two
available messages, and so neither sender can convey full information about the state
of the world. Thus, to be successful, they must coordinate so that they partition
nature fully—that is, their signals ought to give complementary information about
29See discussion in Barrett (2018).
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the full state of nature. So, one sender ought to learn to code for the game, and the
other sender ought to learn to code for the input.
Since there are no pre-assigned roles in the role-free composition game, the con-
ditions for success are also slightly di↵erent. A play now counts as a success just in
case (1) the receiver performs the correct action given the current context (as be-
fore), and (2) Both senders send a signal if and only if the context given by nature
requires both game and input.
After 106 plays per run, the cumulative success rate is 0.9450, on average (1000
runs). About two-thirds of the time (0.67), the agents achieve a cumulative success
rate greater than 0.95, and they sometimes (0.21) achieve a near-perfect cumula-
tive success rate (  0.99). Rarely (0.05), they fail to evolve a maximally-e cient
signalling convention and appear to get caught in pooling equilibria.
4. Discussion
4.1. E cacy and E ciency of Learning Complex Dispositions. Several
subtleties should be noted about the results discussed in the previous sections.
Particularly, a distinction can be made between how e↵ective the agents are at
learning a signalling disposition and how e cient they are at learning that disposi-
tion. E cacy is highlighted by the long-run results—particularly by the avoidance
of partial-pooling equilibria. In this case, as we have already seen, composing sim-
ple dispositions is always more e↵ective than learning a complex disposition from
scratch to achieve a maximally-e cient signalling strategy in the nand game. See
Table 9.
This comparison is made clear in terms of the communicative success rate (av-
erage expected payo↵) over the long-term (106 plays per run) course of these runs
in Figure 9. The co-evolved disposition (3.2) is the most e↵ective, followed by the
model that utilises a pre-evolved unary sub-game disposition (3.1). The extended
models of Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 perform slightly worse in the long run than the
base models; however, they all outperform the atomic case.
28 TRAVIS LACROIX
Atomic Template Pre-Evolved Co-Evolved
nand Transfer Composition Composition
105 106 105 106 105 106 105 106
0.95 0.35 0.54 0.50 — 0.47 0.66 0.64 0.88
0.90 0.50 0.63 0.61 — 0.64 0.79 0.79 0.92
0.80 0.66 0.74 0.78 — 0.84 0.92 0.89 0.96
Learned Full State- Role-Free
Outputs Space Composition
105 106 105 106 105 106
0.95 0.43 0.78 0.10 0.57 0.31 0.67
0.90 0.65 0.84 0.41 0.82 0.60 0.85
0.80 0.79 0.90 0.77 0.93 0.87 0.95
Table 9. Comparison of evolutionary e cacy for learning nand (a) as a novel disposition,
from scratch; (b) via template transfer on a pre-evolved nand disposition; (c) via simple
reinforcement on pre-evolved unary dispositions; and (d) via co-evolved unary dispositions.
These base models are compared with (e) learning the appropriate outputs, (f) learning
from the full state-space, and (g) learning with role-free agents
Figure 9. Comparison of average communicative success rates over 106 plays per run
(e cacy considerations)
The reason for this has to do with the e cacy of the learning rule in the following
sense. When the agents do learn a maximally-e cient signalling disposition in the
atomic nand game, they generally do as well as in any other game. However, they
fail to evolve such a maximally-e cient communication system more often than
in the other cases, which brings the average down. A signalling system obtains a
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maximal payo↵ of 1 in the limit; however, if 0.25 of the runs get caught in partial-
pooling equilibria, then the average payo↵ will rise no higher than 0.937 in the
limit. Thus, these averages tell us something about how e↵ective each model is at
avoiding partial-pooling equilibria.
Upon reflection, this ordering makes some sense. The co-evolutionary nand game
takes advantage of a more complex, hierarchical structure than the flat pre-evolved
and atomic nand game models. The base co-evolutionary model contains fewer
situations that constitute success, which in turn enhances the ability of the agents
to avoid pooling. Furthermore, we can analyse the game in terms of its structural
components: there are situations in which only the sub-game dispositions are rele-
vant. Since we saw in Section 2 that taut and cont are learned more quickly than
id and neg, this comes to bear in a significant way on the co-evolution of complex
dispositions. That is, the complex disposition can be broken up into structural com-
ponents which themselves vary in how di cult they are to learn. The extensions of
the co-evolutionary model do slightly worse because the receiver has more choice
points available to her; however, these complex games still perform better than the
atomic case because they still have components which, in some rounds, are decou-
pled from the more complex game itself. In the atomic case, no such decomposition
is available to the agents.
These long-run results say nothing about how quickly the agents learn such
dispositions. To get a sense of how e cient learning is, we can compare the short-
run results of each of these models. Although the atomic nand game is the least
e↵ective of these models, it is also one of the most e cient. However, because it is
not as e↵ective as the other models, it is eventually surpassed in every case. This
comparison is made clear in terms of the average expected payo↵ over the short
term (104 plays) in Figure 10. Note further that the co-evolutionary games, due
to their complexity, start at a significant disadvantage from the atomic game—the
chance payo↵ is significantly lower in each of these cases. Thus, learning is slow and
steady in each of the co-evolved instances, but it is also extremely e↵ective.
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Figure 10. Comparison of average communicative success rates over 104 plays per run
(e ciency considerations)
A final note about the e cacy of composing unary functions compared to tem-
plate transfer. Barrett and Skyrms (2017) suppose that a nand disposition has
already been evolved. So, evolving a nand disposition, and learning to apply that
disposition to a novel context, are modelled as independent processes. However,
having learned a nand disposition is a necessary condition for there to be a tem-
plate to transfer to a novel context. As such, these should be understood as serial
processes.
The simulation results for learning an atomic nand game from scratch suggest
that approximately 0.25 of the runs result in pooling equilibria. Suppose we have a
population of pairs of senders and receivers. Then, around 0.75 of these pairs will
learn a nand disposition, on average. Those who failed to learn nand would not be
able to transfer these dispositions successfully. We also know from the simulation
results that learning a nand disposition is not su cient for successful transfer
in a novel context: approximately 0.25 of the template transfer runs also result in
pooling equilibria, failing to learn nand in the new context successfully. Thus, when
considering the serial evolution of the complex disposition, slightly more than half
of the population might be successful.
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In contrast, we know that the unary neg disposition is a sure thing. Therefore,
every pair of individuals will learn this disposition. Further, taut is also a sure
thing, so that every pair of individuals will also learn this disposition. Finally,
based on the simulation results of Section 3.1, success in coordination is high so
that approximately 0.92 of those individuals who learned the pre-evolved unary
dispositions will also learn to combine them appropriately into a nand disposition.
Thus, almost everyone in the population will learn this disposition when we consider
the evolution of these dispositions as a combined serial process.
4.2. Other Binary Operations. There is a subtle distinction that comes to light
when we understand binary operators in terms of unary operators. We saw in
Section 2 that taut and cont evolve more quickly than id and neg. So, the
composition of, e.g., taut and cont together should evolve faster than id and
neg, since each of these dispositions is, independently, easier to learn in the former
case than in the latter. I discussed the nand game, since this is the logical operation
that Barrett and Skyrms (2017); Barrett (2019) discuss. However, the nand game—
which is composed of taut and neg—should then evolve faster than, e.g., an iff
game, which is composed of id and neg. We should also expect a binary operation
that is composed of two completely pooling unary operations—for example, a binary
taut operator, to evolve more readily.
Simulation results suggest that this intuition is correct. A comparison of the
cumulative success rates for iff, nand, and taut—being completely representative
of the combinations of completely-separating, half-pooling, and totally-pooling sub-
games—are shown in Table 10. This shows a clear ordering concerning how easy it
is to (quickly) learn a binary disposition as a function of how easy it is to learn the
constituent unary dispositions which underlie it.
The binary tautology (which takes two inputs and always outputs 1) is easiest
to evolve because, in essence, the signal does not matter: the receiver needs only
to react to any signal with the same disposition—a1. This is quickly learned even
in the atomic case. In the case of atomic iff—a binary operation which has no
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Atomic iff Atomic nand Atomic taut
104 106 104 106 104 106
Average 0.7502 0.8997 0.8326 0.9053 0.9968 0.9999
0.99 0.02 0.56 0.00 0.26 1.00 1.00
0.95 0.25 0.72 0.14 0.54 1.00 1.00
0.90 0.35 0.76 0.29 0.63 1.00 1.00
0.80 0.50 0.80 0.53 0.74 1.00 1.00
Table 10. Comparison of three di↵erent ways of combining unary operations (cumulative
success rate) over the short term (104 plays per run) and long term (106 plays per run)
pooling and thus requires co-evolution of strategies—the results are as expected.
Specifically, nand is more likely to get caught in partial-pooling equilibria than iff
and iff is more e cient than nand overall; however, because of the di culty in
co-evolving strategies, iff is more di cult for agents to learn—the variance in the
payo↵s is significantly larger for iff (1.74⇥10 1) than it is for nand (9.95⇥10 2).
Thus, Barrett and Skyrms (2017) do not look at the simplest case when they discuss
template transfer, but they also do not look at the most challenging case.
4.3. To Infinity, and Beyond. How well do these results generalise? There are
two di↵erent ways that agents can learn a ternary-input logical operation: they
might learn to compose two binary-input logical operations appropriately, or they
might learn to compose four unary input logical operations. These two possibilities
are illustrated in Table 11 for evolving nand.
In the unary case, the last index of the ternary state provides the unary input for
the unary sub-game. The first index of the ternary state distinguishes the top two
possibilities from the bottom two, and the second index distinguishes the top unary
sub-game from the bottom one (for each partition). In the binary case, there are 16
unique binary operations that we might take account of, assuming the order of the
outputs matters. When the sender and receiver play a game which takes advantage
of an underlying binary predisposition, we have a signalling game with two states,
two signals, and 16 actions.
As with the binary-input nand game, the players might co-evolve their strategies.
The co-evolved ternary-input nand game may also be modelled in several di↵erent
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a1 a2
0 1
s000 h0,0, 0i 0 1
 
taut
s001 h0,0, 1i 0 1
s010 h0,1, 0i 0 1
 
taut
s011 h0,1, 1i 0 1
s100 h1,0, 0i 0 1
 
taut
s101 h1,0, 1i 0 1
s110 h1,1, 0i 0 1
 
neg
s111 h1,1, 1i 1 0
(a) Ternary logical operator as the com-
position of two binary logical operators
a1 a2
0 1
s000 h0, 0, 0i 0 1
9>>=>>;2-tauts001 h0, 0, 1i 0 1s010 h0, 1, 0i 0 1
s011 h0, 1, 1i 0 1
s100 h1, 0, 0i 0 1
9>>=>>;2-nands101 h1, 0, 1i 0 1s110 h1, 1, 0i 0 1
s111 h1, 1, 1i 1 0
(b) Ternary logical operator as the com-
position of two binary logical operators
Table 11. Two di↵erent ways of composing a ternary nand operation. (a) shows the
composition of four unary operations, whereas (b) shows the composition of two binary
operations.
ways, depending on whether or not the underlying co-evolved game is a logic game
with unary inputs or binary inputs. As the dimension of the game increases, so too
do the degrees of freedom concerning modelling decisions.
5. Conclusion
One thing that came out in the discussion of unary functions is that the id- and
neg games are structurally more similar to one another than they are to either
of the taut- and cont games, and vice-versa. This highlights a subtlety that the
analysis of Barrett and Skyrms (2017) ignores. Barrett and Skyrms (2017) suggest
that “[o]nce nand has evolved, it may be appropriated to a new context by template
transfer to play the role of a di↵erent logical operator more e ciently than that
operator might evolve on its own” (350-1). They report that evolving or from nand
happens an order of magnitude faster than evolving or from scratch.
In a suggestive footnote, they point out that “[m]ore generally, if one had five
binary logical operators, one for each number of false outputs, one could get the
other eleven by template transfer. And each would evolve an order of magnitude
faster this way than on its own.” However, it would not do to have four binary
logical operators. Further, template transfer fails to explain how one might be
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able to evolve, e.g., and from nand, given that they have a di↵erent number of
‘false’ values in their truth tables. A virtue of the model presented here is that it is
obvious how one would evolve each binary operator from combinations of two unary
operators—it was mentioned that the unique permutations of two unary sub-games
cover all 16 binary games. Finally, template transfer does not show how to evolve a
ternary-input logical operator from a binary-input logical operator. Though Barrett
and Skyrms (2017) do not suggest this, their process of modular composition more
generally should be su cient for this purpose, as has been shown here.
The key insight was to start with unary logical operations, and show how these
can compose to more e ciently evolve binary logical operations. Further, the as-
sumption that the underlying simple disposition(s) must be pre-evolved was relaxed.
Finally, this compositional extends in a natural way to learn ternary logical oper-
ations from two binary logical operations or four unary logical operations, and so
on ad infinitum.
In some sense, the e cacy of template transfer on a pre-evolved disposition
should come as no surprise. Since the sender dispositions in the original context are
fixed, the sender in the new context is e↵ectively playing a sensory-manipulation
game. Furthermore, since the two senders are entirely independent, these branches
constitute two independent 2 ⇥ 2 sensory-manipulation games—the work of com-
posing these two games has already been achieved by the pre-evolved disposition.
We have now seen, in a more general case, once the agents in a signalling context
have evolved simple unary operators, they might be able to use these previously
evolved dispositions to learn new, more complex binary, ternary, etc. operations.
Though I have discussed logical operations as a concrete example, it should be
clear that it is the process of modular composition itself that gives rise to e cacy
in the evolution of complex dispositions.
Such compositional processes (more generally) might be instantiated in nature
in terms of the computational principles or neurobiological underpinnings of any
adaptive decision-making process. Modular composition may arise, and aid e cacy
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or e ciency of such processes, in several di↵erent settings; for example, composing
multiple sensory modalities, such as tactile and visual stimulation (Fazeli et al.,
2019); arranging dominance-relations to form a hierarchical representation of a so-
cial group (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2018); cognitive reasoning involving hierarchically
organised decision-making (Sarafyazd and Jazayeri, 2019); or other such functional-
demand protocols in nature, such as the availability of food, density of populations,
and presence of predators in migratory species (Hopcraft et al., 2014).
When signals mediate these processes, the models provided here illustrate par-
ticular circumstances under which we might expect modular composition to be
successful. When the agents in a signalling game are understood as distinct organ-
isms, this may give rise to complex social behaviour; when they are interpreted as
functional components of a single organism, this may give rise to complex cognition.
In the context of language origins, this sort of explanation is essential since an
adequate description of how linguistic capacities might arise from simple commu-
nicative precursors is a diachronic story of how language gets to be complex over
time via a combination of genetic and cultural evolution. Results of this sort help
carve out the space of possibilities for how such dispositions may have arisen in the
first place.
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